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This study provides some insights of investors’ view on auditor independence focusing on auditor switching. Hence, 
the purpose of this study is to examine the effect of appointing a new auditor on investors’ reliability on reported 
earnings in financial accounts. Analyses are based on a matched-pair sample of 162 listed companies in the Bursa 
Malaysia for the year 2011. The results of the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression show that earnings response 
coefficients for auditor switching companies are significantly higher than for non-auditor switching companies. The 
results provide support for the contention that investors place greater reliability on the financial accounts audited by 
newly appointed auditors. This finding is consistent with the Malaysian audit market where long audit tenure is a 
common practice and auditor switching is considered rare. Findings provide support for the long discussed issue of 
the importance of auditor rotation in maintaining auditor independence. 
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Introduction 
Auditor switching is a phenomenon whereby the incumbent auditor is not appointed for the upcoming 
financial year. In some countries, such as Bolivia and Indonesia, auditor switching is mandatory after a period 
of time. However, in Malaysia and as in many other countries, a more lenient way of mandatory requirement 
has been adopted, whereby only rotation of audit partner in charge is required. The Malaysian Institute of 
Accountants requires mandatory audit partner rotation of a client after a period of five years. Therefore, it can 
be observed that long audit tenure is a common practice and auditor switching is considered rare in Malaysia 
(Abdul Nasser, Abdul Wahid, Syed Mustapha Nazri, & Hudaib, 2006; Malek, 2005). The debate on mandatory 
auditor rotation emerges from the view that long audit tenure creates a close relationship between auditor and 
auditee, which may impair auditor independence. It is argued that the tendency for an auditor to gradually align 
with the management increases with the audit tenure (Geiger & Raghunandan, 2002). Long audit tenure has 
also been argued to affect the auditor’s desire to deect misstatements in the financial accounts (Carcello & 
Nagy, 2004) but at the same time, the appointment of a new auditor may be beneficial in acquiring a fresh 
perspective. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The nexts ction presents a literature review focusing on 
auditor independence and auditor switching. Section 3 discusses the theoretical rationale to relate auditor 
switching and earnings response coefficient, whilst Section 4 explains the research methodology employed. 
Section 5 discusses the results of the analyses and the last section concludes the findings. 
Literature Review 
Auditor Independence 
The issue of auditor independence is not new as can be observed from many literatures discussing this 
issue in different aspects. Independent auditing has beenrecognized as an essential feature of an efficient 
capital market and regulators have long been concerned with the potential threats to auditor independence 
(DeFond, Raghunandan, & Subramanyam, 2002). The independent status of an auditor gives value and 
significance to audit reports (Lavin, 1976). Houghton and Jubb (2003) postulated that auditors are not only 
required to be independent but also been seen as indepe nt. Two approaches have b en used by researchers 
in examining the factors that may affect auditor independence, which are the survey and theory-driven 
approaches. The survey approach requir s researchers to conduct surveys on auditors and financial statement 
users regarding their perceptions of auditor independence (Iyer & Rama, 2004; Swanger & Chewning, 2001). 
However, there has been evidence on the existence of expectation gaps among the subjects. Due to this, 
increasing studies have been done by using the theory-driven approach, which permits a more objective 
investigation. This approach, which is conducted by using archival data to measure behavioral constructs, 
necessitates the use of proxies to measure the underlyi g behavioral relationships (Seabright, Levinthal, & 
Fichman, 1992). 
Auditor Switching 
Earlier studies on auditor switching focus on auditor change and auditor choice issues. However, auditor 
switching studies should also consider audit tenure issues. It can be observed from the auditor change literatures 
of some of the negative views on auditor switching. The negative views can be related to the perception that 
companies change their auditors due to unresolved conflicts between the management and auditor. For example, 
researchers have found that dissatisfaction over audit fees and dissatisfaction on auditor’s reports are among the 
main factors in auditor change decisions (Craswell, 1988; Roberts, Glezen, & Jones, 1990). At the same time, the 
negative views on auditor switching can also be related to the concerns over the independence of newly 
appointed auditors. For example, Geiger and Raghunandan (2002) argued that new auditors face early dismissal 
threats, which makes them more complacent to the management. The study further argued that due to limited 
information of the dismissal, the market may view early dismissals as a problem with the auditor, not the auditee, 
and this will affect their reputations in the market. Furthe more, the stigma over the practices of low-balling can 
also be related to the negative views on newly appointed auditors, where the auditor charges lower fees in the 
early years of audit appointment before recouping the cost in the subsequent years, which has been argued to 
impair auditor independence. The practice of low-balling causes the auditors to retain their clients long enough 
to recoup the price-cutting cost or recover its start-up cost, and this desire may impair auditor independence 
(Geiger & Raghunandan, 2002). Researchers have also r i ed their concerns on the competence of newly 
appointed auditors. Carcello and Nagy (2004) argued that unfamiliarization and lack of client-specific 
knowledge in the early years of audit engagement can limit the auditors’ ability in discharging their roles.  
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Meanwhile, long tenure, based on audit tenure literature, can impair auditor independence (Carcello & 
Nagy, 2004; Geiger & Raghunandan, 2002). This is based on the perception that long audit tenure creates a 
close relationship between the auditor and the management. Geiger and Raghunandan (2002) argued that the 
tendency of auditor to gradually align with the management increases with the audit tenure. This argument is 
consistent with the attachment theory which states that the degree of attachment increases with the duration of 
the relationship (Meyer, Rigsby, & Boone, 2007; Seabright et al., 1992) and that attachment develops mutual 
trust among the parties (Westphal, 1999). This mutual trust causes one party to be willing to take risks or to 
make oneself vulnerable (Westphal, 1999). In addition to this, it is also argued that long audit tenure may affect 
the auditor’s desire to detect irregularities in the financial accounts. Carcello and Nagy (2004) argued that the 
auditor’s sceptism may decrease with the audit tenure due to their knowledge of the attributes’ quality of the 
corporation (such as internal controls and management integrity). This downward sceptism may cause auditors 
to conduct less extensive audit work, which then may decrease their abilities to detect misstatements. Evidence 
by Copley and Doucet (1993) seems to support these arguments whereby they had found that audit tenure is 
positively related to substandard financial reporting. The governments’ concern has led to the auditor’s tenure 
restrictions in some countries, such as Bangladesh, Bolivia, and Indonesia. However, many countries only 
required for audit partner rotation. Thus, it explains the reason why long audit tenure is a common practice and 
auditor switching is rare in these countries. While mandatory partner tenure restriction perhaps could avoid the 
close relationship between auditee and audit partner in charge, this, however, could not avoid the close 
relationship between auditee and audit firms. 
Theoretical Framework 
Earlier studies have found that earnings performance is positively related to share r turn (Cheng & Ariff, 
2007; Lee & Park, 2000). The findings are consistent with the semi-strong efficient market theory proposed by 
Fama (1970) which posits that investors will instantaneously adjust their expectations on asset value upon 
receiving new information which in turn is reflected instantaneously in asset prices. Meanwhile, Holthausen 
and Verrecchia (1988) modeled the investors’ reactions on the reported earnings or usually termed as earnings 
response coefficient as the function of the prior uncertainty about the underlying value of the entity and the 
perceived noise in the entity’s reported numbers. While the informative value of earnings varies, the study 
postulated that by holding the prior uncertainty constant, the earnings response coefficient will increase with 
the perceived quality of the earnings. 
Financial statements can be viewed as a joint statement by the management and auditor (Antle & Nalebuff, 
1991). Even though in reality, the financial statements are prepared by the company, the auditor may request for 
the adjustments. Therefore, investors’ reliability on reported earnings can be related to their perceptions of audit 
quality. Auditor switching might alter the perceptions of the reliability of the financial statements. Positive 
connotations on auditor switching may enhance investors’ confidence towards the audited financial statements. 
As noted earlier, most of the literature on auditor change highlighted the negative views of auditor switching on 
audit quality, whilst literatures on audit tenure highlighted the positive views. Even though empirical studies 
have found that auditor change is due to the unresolved conflicts between the management and auditor, 
researchers also found that companies change auditors ue to quality consideration. For example, Francis and 
Wilson (1988) and DeFond (1992) had found that companies change their auditors due to the demand for a more 
quality auditor. At the same time, the concern of low-balling seems to be anecdotal, where empirical evidence on 
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the practice is weak to conclude the occurrences of the practice (Butterworth & Houghton, 1995). However, 
whilst auditor change literature highlighted the concerns on new auditors’ competences, the appointment of new 
auditors may be beneficial in acquiring a fresh perspective. Meanwhile, many studies in Malaysia have shown 
that long audit tenure is a common practice and the phenom n of auditor switching is considerably rare. For 
example, Abdul Nasser et al. (2006) found that for 297 companies on the Main and Second boards in the years 
from 1990 to 2000, the average auditor tenure is almost seven years and only 29% of companies have changed 
their auditors during the period. Meanwhile, Malek (2005) reported that in 2001, only 2% of the listed 
companies on the Main and Second boards changed their auditors, whilst 15% of the listed companies on the 
Main and Second boards changed their auditors in 2003. Considering these facts, auditor switching may have 
positive connotations by the investors of the Bursa Malaysia. Therefore, it can be postulated that auditor 
switching companies will have higher earnings response coefficients than non-auditor switching companies. 
Research Methodology 
Sample 
The analyses are based on listed companies in the Bursa Malaysia for the year 2011. From 956 listed 
companies as at December 31, 2011, 86 companies have been identified to have switched their 2010’s auditors. 
However, five companies are excluded in the sample due to unavailability of data (delisted companies).     
For control purposes, another 81 companies matched by assets size and earnings performance are included in 
the sample, thus bringing the final sample to 162 companies. The information of auditors is collected from 
annual reports, the announcement date is based on the announcement date on the Bursa Malaysia’s website, nd 
the data on share prices and composite ind x are collected from the Bursa Station. 
Model 
The effect of auditor switching on earnings response co fficient is examined using the ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression and takes the following form: 
0 1 2 3 4
5 6
CAR EP EP SWITCH EP FEE EP OPINION
EP BIG ASSET
β β β β β
β 4 β μ
= + + ∗ + ∗ + ∗ +
∗ + +         (1) 
where: 
CAR: Cumulative abnormal return; 
EP: Earnings performance; 
SWITCH: Auditor switching; 
FEE: Audit fee; 
OPINION: Audit opinion; 
BIG4: Auditor type; 
ASSET: Assets size; 
μ: Error term. 
The Sharpe’s (1964) market model is used to measur the abnormal returns. The abnormal return of stock i 
on date t will be calculated as the difference between the actual return and the expected return for this date and 
will take the following form: 
( )it it itAR R E R= −                                   (2) 
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The actual return of stock i on date t will be calculated as the difference between the closing price on date t and 
date t − 1 divided by closing price on date t − 1. The expected returns will be deriv d from the following equation:  
( )it i i mtE R Rα β= −                                   (3) 
where:  
E(Rit) = Expected return of company i on day t; 
Rmt = Market index return on day t;  
αi = Unsystematic returns for company i; 
βi = Systematic risk for company i.  
The model assumes a stable linear relation between the market return and the share return. The estimated 
coefficients, α and β, are calculated by regressing the stock returns with market returns using daily closing 
prices and daily Bursa Malaysia Composite Index over the 200 trading days (-230; -31) using the OLS 
regression. The Financial Times and Stock Exchange (FTSE) Bursa Malaysia Composite Index will be used as 
a proxy for the market return. It will be calculated as the difference between the market index on date t and date 








CAR t t AR= ∑                                  (4)  
where:  
CARi(t0t2): Cumulative abnormal returns from t0 to t2 day of event window;  
ARit: Abnormal return of company i on day t;  
t0: Announcement date of quarterly earnings;  
t2: Day 2 after announcement date. 
The widely used measurement of earnings performance is by dividing the difference between the actual 
earnings per share and expected earnings per share with the market value of share prior to the earnings’ 
announcement date (Balsam, Krishnan, & Yang, 2003; Krishnan, Sami, & Zhang, 2005). However, whilst 
earnings forecast (the measurement usually used for expected earnings) is not publicly available in Malaysia, 
consistent with prior Malaysian studies, the naive expectation model is used (Fah & Nasir, 2010; Hussin, 
Ahmed, & Ying, 2010). The model assumes that the next period’s expected earnings is the current period’s 
earnings. Therefore, the following measurement will be used to measure the earnings performance: 
( 1) 2[ ] /[ ]it it i t iEP EPS EPS P− −= −                           (5) 
where: 
EPit: Earnings performance of company i for year t;  
EPSit: Earnings per share of company i for year t; 
EPSi(t-1): Earnings per share of company i for year t − 1; 
Pi-2: Share prices of company i on two days prior to earnings announcement.  
A dichotomous measurement taking the value of 0 if the observed company appointed the same auditor as 
2010 and 1 if the observed company appointed a new auditor is used to measure SWITCH. FEE is measured by 
the natural logarithm of audit services fee. OPINION is a dichotomous variable. The measurement taking the 
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value of 0 if the observed company receives other types of audit opinions than standard unqualified opinions 
and the value of 1 if the observed company receives standard unqualified audit opinions is used. BIG4 is a 
dichotomous variable which takes the value of 0 if the observed company is audited by non-brand name auditor 
and the value of 1 if the observed company is audited by brand name auditor. ASSET is measured by the natural 
logarithm of total assets. 
Result 
Table 1 presents the frequency distribution and Pearson chi-squared result between switchig and 
non-switching companies based on auditor type and audit opinion. It can be observed that most of         
the switching companies are audited by non-brand name uditors, whilst only a slight majority of 
non-switching companies are audited by brand name auditors. Pearson chi-square is significant at the level of 
1%, which indicates that the frequency distribution is significantly different. Table 1 also shows that the 
majority of both types of companies received standard unqualified audit opinions. Even though it can be 
observed that the percentage of non-switching companies receiving standard unqualified aud t opinions is 




Frequency Distribution and Pearson Chi-Squared Result Between Switching and Non-switching Companies 
Based on Auditor Type and Audit Opinion 
Variable No. of switching companies (%) No. of non-switching companies (%) Pearson chi-square 
Auditor type:     
Brand name 18 (22) 39 (48) 11.937* 
Non-brand name 63 (78) 42 (52) 
Audit opinion:  
Standard unqualified 69 (85) 75 (93)  1.714 
Others 12 (15)  6 (7) 
Note. * indicates significance at the level of 1%. 
 
Table 2 presents the frequency distribution between successor auditor (2011 auditor) and predecessor 
auditor (2010 auditor) based on auditor type for auditor switching companies only. It can be observed that a 
majority of companies switch their non-brand name auditors, but more companies are audited by non-brand 
name auditors after the switch. From the total of 81 companies, 56% of companies switch auditors from 
non-brand name to other non-brand name, whilst only 9% of companies switch auditors from brand name to 
other brand name. Meanwhile, 14% of companies switch auditors from non-brand name to brand name and 22% 
of companies switch auditors from brand name to non-bra d name. The Pearson chi-square test shows an 
insignificant distribution difference. 
 
Table 2 
Frequency Distribution and Pearson Chi-Squared Result Between Predecessor and Successor Auditors Based 
on Auditor Type 
Auditor type Non-brand name 2011 (No. (%)) Brand name 2011 (No. (%)) Pearson chi-square 
Non-brand name 2010 45 (56) 11 (14) 0.6894 
Brand name 2010 18 (22)  7 (9) 
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Table 3 presents the results of the OLS regression. The model is significant at the level of 10%.       
The adjusted R-square of 0.041 implies that about 4% of the variation in CAR can be explained by the    
model. The low adjusted R-square is consistent with earlier studies, such as Francis and Ke (2006) and 
Krishnan et al. (2005). 
 
Table 3 
OLS Regression Result 
Variable Expected sign Coefficient t-value p-value 
EP + 0.005 1.93 0.056 
EP*SWITCH + 0.001 2.71 0.007 
EP*FEE + -0.001 -1.93 0.055 
EP*OPINION + 0.000 1.00 0.321 
EP*BIG4 + 0.000 0.46 0.643 
ASSET + 0.015 1.72 0.088 
Constant -0.137 -1.86 0.065 
Adjusted R-square 0.041 0.051 
 
As expected, the coefficient of the variable EP is positive and significant at the level of 5%, which proves 
that earnings performance is positively related to the abnormal returns. This is consistent with earlier findings 
by Cheng and Ariff (2007) and Lee and Park (2000) and the theory of semi-strong efficient market theory 
proposed by Fama (1970). Meanwhile, consistent with the hypothesis, the coefficient of the variable 
EP*SWITCH is positive and significant at the level of 1%. This implies that auditor switching companies have 
higher earnings response coefficients than non-switching companies, thus supporting the argument that in the 
audit market environment where long tenure is a common practice and auditor switching is rare, appointing a 
new auditor shall gain the investors’ confidence in the reliability of the audited earnings. Investors place greater 
reliability of earnings audited by newly appointed auditors due to the belief that newly appointed auditors are 
more independent. The coefficients for ASSET and EP*FEE are also found significant. The positive coefficient 
of ASSET indicates that companies with higher asset sizes have higher returns. The negative coefficient of 
EP*FEE implies that lower perceived reliability of earnings is placed on companies audited by highly paid 
auditors. This is consistent with earlier studies in Malaysia which had also found negative perceptions       
of auditor independence associated with high audit fees (Abu Bakar, Abdul Rahman, & Abdul Rashid, 2005; 
Teoh & Lim, 1996). Meanwhile, the coefficients for EP*OPINION and EP*BIG4 are both insignificant even 
though both have positive coefficients as expected. 
Conclusions 
Auditing has long been recognized as an important element in the corporate structure due to the belief that 
it can enhance the users’ confidence towards the financial accounts. However, the perception of the impairment 
on auditor independence has caused the investors’ reliability on the financial accounts to deteriorate. While 
long audit tenure is believed to may impair auditor independence, appointing a new auditor may gain back the 
investors’ confidence. The OLS regression results of 162 matched-paired listed companies in the Bursa 
Malaysia in 2011 had found that the earnings response coefficients for auditor switching companies are higher 
than for those of non-auditor switching companies. The results imply that investors perceived higher reliability 
on earnings audited by newly appointed auditors. The findings provide support for the long discussed issue of 
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the importance to limit auditor tenure. However, it should be noted that the evidence is derived from Malaysia, 
where long audit tenure is a common practice and auditor switching is rare. For future studies, it is suggested to 
include the direction and reasons of auditor switching in examining this issue. 
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